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Abstract 
 
Our paper tests a key prediction of property rights theory: that agents respond to marginal 
incentives embedded in property rights, when making non-contractible, revenue-enhancing 
investments.  (Grossman  and  Hart,  1986;  Hart  and  Moore,  1990).  Using  rich  project-level 
data  from  the  US  film  industry,  we  exploit  variation  in  property  right  allocations, 
investment  choices,  and  film  revenues  to  test  the  distinctive  aspects  of  property  rights 
theory. Empirical tests of these key theoretical predictions have been relatively sparse due 
to the lack of appropriate data. The US film industry displays two distinct allocations of 
property  rights,  which  differentially  affect  marginal  returns  on  a  particular  class  of 
investments. Studio-financed films are produced and distributed by studios which take in 
the lion’s share of revenue. In contrast, independent films are distributed by studios under 
revenue sharing agreements, which give studios 30-40% of the revenue stream. Under either 
regime, the allocation of scarce marketing resources is determined by and paid for by the 
studio. After accounting for the endogenous nature of property-right allocations, we find 
that studio-financed films receive superior marketing investments compared to independent 
films and that these investments fully mediate the positive effect of vertical integration on 
film  revenues.  As  a  result,  this  study  contributes  to  the  empirical  literature  on  property 
rights by showing that both predicted linkages (from marginal returns to investment and 
from investment to revenue) exist in a single empirical setting.   3 
In  this  paper  we  exploit  institutional  features  of  the  U.S.  film  industry  to  test  a  key 
prediction of property rights theory: that agents respond to marginal incentives embedded in 
property rights, when making non-contractible, revenue-enhancing investments. (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) The importance of contractibility and the impact of marginal 
incentives  on  ex ante investments are two  ways in  which property rights theory differs from 
transaction  cost  economics  (TCE)  in  predicting  the  boundaries  of  firms  (Whinston,  2003; 
Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). But while TCE theories of firm boundaries have been extensively 
tested (see Lafontaine and Slade, 2007 for a review), tests of the distinctive aspects of property 
rights theory are relatively sparse.  
The  US  film  industry  displays  two  distinct  allocations  of  property  rights,  which 
differentially affect marginal returns on a particular class of investments. Studio-financed films 
are acquired by major distributors before filming takes place. In most cases, the studio then pays 
production and marketing costs and receives substantially all of net revenue from the film, after 
payments to theatre owners. In contrast, so-called independent films contract with studios for 
distribution  after  filming  takes  place.  The  contracts  are  most  commonly  revenue-sharing 
agreements wherein the studio gets approximately 30% of net revenue as a distribution fee and 
the independent producer gets the balance (Caves, 2000; Corts, 2001). After filming takes place, 
the costs of producing the movie are sunk, but marketing investments remain to be determined. 
And  regardless  of  whether  the  film  is  studio-financed  or  independent,  according  to  industry 
practice,  the  studio  exercises  control  over  marketing  decisions  and  pays  100%  of  residual 
marketing  expenses  (net  of  direct  print  and  advertising  charges)  (Corts,  2001;  Sorenson  and 
Waguespack, 2006).  
The  presence  of  revenue-sharing  agreements  for  independent  films  plus  the  fact  that 
studios both control and pay 100% of residual marketing costs means that the two film types 
offer studios different marginal returns on their marketing investments. If marketing is a non-
contractible investment, property rights theory predicts that (1) studios will underinvest in the   4 
marketing of independent films relative to studio-financed films; and (2) the underinvestment 
will have a negative impact on the revenues of independent films.  
Using  a  sample  of  1092  studio-financed  films  and  428  independent  films  released 
between 1994 and 2008, and controlling for endogenous selection, we test these predictions. We 
control for the endogeneity of the financing decision (the choice of film type) using a two-stage 
treatment effects model (Heckman, 1979). We then explicitly test for mediation—that film type 
affects revenue through marketing investments—using a three-stage model (Shaver, 2005). Subject 
to  caveats  discussed  below,  our  tests  provide  evidence  that  marginal  incentives  do  affect 
marketing  investments  in  the  predicted  direction,  and  also  show  that  marketing  investments 
positively and significantly affect subsequent box-office revenues. We further hypothesize that 
underinvestment in marketing reduces the value of large-budget films more than small-budget 
films. Consistent with this hypothesis, we show that  large-budget films are more likely to be 
studio financed than small-budget films.  
This paper thus provides empirical support for two key tenets of property rights theory: 
(1) different marginal incentives conveyed by property rights affect downstream non-contractible 
investments; and (2) such investments in turn affect subsequent economic performance. In formal 
models based on these assumptions, Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) have 
argued  that  allocations  of  property  rights  are  not  value-neutral:  some  configurations  of 
ownership rights can create more value than others. Our analysis indicates that, ceteris paribus, 
studio-financed films are more valuable than independent films. (This raises the question of why 
independent films exist at all, which we address in the conclusion.) 
In  addition  to  testing  key  predictions  of  property  rights  theory,  this  paper  also 
contributes to the broader literature on vertical integration. The literature can be divided into 
three parts: (1) studies of the decision to vertically integrate; (2) studies of the consequences of 
vertical integration for investment behavior; and (3) studies of the impact of vertical integration 
on performance.    5 
A  very  large  number  of  studies  have  looked  at  the  decision  to  vertically  integrate 
forward or backward, and we will not be able to do justice to that literature here. LaFontaine and 
Slade  (2007)  provide  a  comprehensive  overview.  Notably,  the  literature  focused  on  forward 
integration  shows  that  concerns  about  agency  and  marginal  incentives  affect  the  decision  to 
vertically integrate. Specifically, empirical studies of the ownership of retail outlets show that, as 
corporate effort becomes more important, vertical integration is more likely, and conversely as 
monitoring of retail agents becomes more costly, integration is less likely (LaFontaine and Slade, 
2007, p. 647). Pointing to the  formal similarities between agency and property rights models, 
LaFontaine  and  Slade  (2007)  argue  that  these  results  can  be  interpreted  as  supporting  the 
distinctive predictions of property rights theory.  
The  impact  of  vertical  integration  on  investment  behavior  has  been  investigated  by 
Mullainathan  and  Scharfstein  (2001),  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2010),  Ciliberto  (2006),  and  Gil  (2009).  
Using  data  on  capacity  investments  made  by  chemical  firms  in  the  plastics  industry, 
Mullainathan and Scharfstein (2001) show that vertically integrated firms invest more heavily in 
plant  capacity  than  do  non-integrated  firms.  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2010)  examine  firms  from  the 
United Kingdom and find that firms that produce a higher proportion of their inputs in-house 
also exhibit higher R&D investments. Ciliberto (2006) investigates vertical integration between 
physicians  and  hospitals  and  finds  that  over  time  integrated  hospitals  add  more  healthcare 
services than non-integrated hospitals. Forman and Gron (2011) show that vertical integration in 
distribution increases the speed with which insurers adopt complementary consumer Internet 
applications.  Finally, Gil (2009) explores vertical integration between distributors and theater 
owners in the Spanish movie industry, and finds that integrated theaters run their own movies 
for  longer  periods  than  other  movies.  Broadly  speaking,  these  papers  show  that  vertical 
integration  differentially  affects  firms’  investment  decisions,  but  do  not  consider  the 
determinants of vertical  integration choices nor the  subsequent  impact  of the  investments on 
performance.    6 
Another stream of literature compares the performance of vertically integrated and non-
integrated firms on various dimensions but does not link performance to investment. Comparing 
internal procurement, alliances, and market transactions in the automobile industry, Gulati et al. 
(2005) find that intermediate levels of vertical integration, i.e., alliances, outperform both internal 
procurement  and  market  transactions  when  the  task  structure  is  interdependent  and  the 
transaction  environment  unstable.  Forbes  and  Lederman  (2010)  find  that  vertical  integration 
between  major  and  regional  airlines  reduces  departure  delays.  Using  satellite  tracking  data, 
Natividad  (2012)  finds  that  vertical  integration  boosts  the  productivity  of  fishing  vessels, 
seemingly because the owned vessels follow headquarter instructions more faithfully.  
A small but growing number of papers specifically examine the consequences of vertical 
integration  for  new  product  performance  (Macher  and  Richman,  2008).  Leiblein  et  al.  (2002) 
examine the impact of vertical integration on the technological performance of new products. 
Macher (2006) and Macher and Boerner (2012) look at manufacturing efficiency and development 
speed. Rothaermel et al. (2006) consider the reviews new products receive from experts. Adner 
and Kapoor (2010) and Kapoor and Adner (2011) look at firm-level market share and time-to-
market  for  new  product  generations.  These  studies  shed  light  on  the  relationship  between 
vertical integration and product outcomes, but, because of data limitations, they cannot show 
how differences in product outcomes affect  firms’ revenue or profitability.  
Recently,  Gil  and  Warzynski  (2010)  have  shown  that  video  games  produced  in  a 
vertically integrated manner obtain higher revenues, possibly as a result of better release timing 
and  post-release  marketing  strategies.  However,  their  analysis  does  not  take  account  of  the 
potential endogeneity of the vertical integration decision. The present paper extends their work 
by  controlling  for  endogeneity  and  by  testing  for  a  mediation  effect  between  marketing 
investment and revenue. To our knowledge, this paper is first to provide evidence that vertical 
integration affects the revenue of specific products through its impact on marketing investments 
in those products.    7 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We next present an overview of the U.S. 
motion picture industry, highlighting its structure, financing arrangements, and the challenges 
faced  by  ‘independent’  productions.  We  then  derive  specific  hypotheses  with  the  help  of  a 
theoretical model. We go on to describe our data, present our empirical tests and results, and 
offer robustness checks and alternative explanations. The final section concludes. 
Institutional Background 
Basic Organization 
Film-making  can  be  divided  into  four  stages:  concept  development,  film  production, 
distribution, and screening. The concept development stage begins when a producer procures or 
‘options’ a film script from a literary agent. The producer is typically an individual or group of 
individuals  (who  may  or  may  not  have  their  own  production  company).  The  producer  then 
makes  choices  regarding  the  film’s  budget,  director,  and  cast.  Costs  incurred  in  the  concept 
development  stage  are  relatively  low  and  borne  by  the  producer.  Once  the  producer  has 
assembled a project with a principal cast and projected budget, she must then seek financing for 
the film – either from a distributor or other sources. Films that are not financed by a distributor, 
but by independent sources are called ‘independent films’ (Martin, 2009).  
During the production stage, a crew is formed and the film is shot (typically over the 
course of a few months) and then edited. When filming is complete, most of the production costs 
are sunk, and the movie is said to be “in the can.”  
Once a movie has been produced, it must be distributed to theaters. Distribution entails 
the  physical  distribution  of  prints  to  theaters,  marketing  the  movie  in  each  territory,  and 
monitoring the collection of revenues from theater owners (Eliashberg et al., 2006). A number of 
key decisions are made by distributors concerning the marketing strategy for the film. These 
include the amount of marketing expenditures that they should invest to promote the film, and   8 
which media to use in the advertising campaign (ibid.). Furthermore, distributors negotiate with 
theater operators over the number of screens that movies will be allocated in their opening week. 
Six major studios—Paramount Pictures, Universal Studios, Warner Bros. Pictures, Sony 
Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, and Disney—control essentially all film distribution in North 
America, thus in the industry the terms “studio” and “distributor” are used interchangeably. 
Using  data  on  screens  and  distributors  from  Variety  Magazine,  we  determined  that  movies 
distributed by these six companies occupy (on average) over 85% of all theater screens available 
in a given week. A significant entry barrier into the distribution market lies in the fixed cost of a 
maintaining a sales network with offices across North America to negotiate and arrange contracts 
with theater operators for each film. These sales offices of the network hold the “assets of local 
knowledge and the advantages of repeated dealings with exhibitors”, and the system as a whole 
is  capable  of  coordinating  the  large-scale  simultaneous  promotion  for  different  films  (Caves, 
2000).
1  
The capabilities of distributors to negotiate and secure theatrical screens and to market 
films to the public represent a resource vital t o the commercial performance of any film. As a 
result,  theatrical  distribution  represents  a  complementary  asset  (Teece,  1986)  –  any  movie 
produced  upstream  must  secure  access  to  these  distribution  resources  in  order  to  succeed 
commercially.
2 
 
Film Types, Financing and Revenue Shares 
As indicated a film may be studio-financed or independent. For a studio-financed film, in 
most  cases,  the  studio  pays  all  production  and  marketing  costs  and  has  rights  to  all  rental 
                                                            
1 The distribution marketplace has remained very concentrated amongst a few firms for several decades 
despite  entry.  New  distributors  who  entered  the  market  failed  and  exited  due  to  their  lack  of  strong 
relationships with theater operators and an inconsistent pipeline of product to offer these operators (Caves, 
2000). 
2 If a movie cannot secure theatrical distribution, it may still be released directly on DVD. However, the 
commercial upside remains limited since theatrical release and the marketing that accompanies it represent 
a significant driver of DVD sales (Ravid, 1999; Sorenson and Waguespack, 2006).   9 
revenue, after payments to theatre owners, which are typically 30% of gross box-office receipts.3 
Throughout the process, the studio maintains residual rights of control over the project, including 
the  right to  fire and  replace individuals.  In contrast,  for  an independent film,  a production 
company pays the production cost and maintain s residual rights of control. For such films, the 
distributor typically keeps 30% of domestic rental revenue and 40% of foreign rental revenue as a 
distribution fee (Sorenson and Waguespack, 2006; De Vany, 2006).  The rest of the revenue, net of 
direct print and advertising costs, is paid to the production company. 
Studio-financed  films  are  sometimes  “co-financed”  by  an  independent  production 
company or another studio. In such cases, the two financing entities will split the film’s revenue 
after  paying  a  distribution  fee.  Goettler  and  Leslie  (2005)  found  that  between  1987  and  2000 
approximately  one-third  of  studio-financed  films  were  co-financed.  Co-financed  films  have 
marginal returns that are lower than solo-financed films, but higher than independent films. For 
example, Disney’s agreement with Pixar gave Disney approximately 55% of the net revenue of 
those co-financed films.  Our theoretical model allows for variation in the marginal returns to 
studio-financed films. 
Several prior studies have explored the production-distribution interface in the movie 
industry. Corts (2001) examines the release-date choices of distributors and finds that when two 
films share a production company and a distributor, the films are released further apart. Doing so 
softens direct competition between the films. Fee (2002) explores the choice of distributors to 
finance films and finds that it is less likely when the project has high ‘artistic stake’ i.e. when the 
producer of the film, also served as its director and writer.  Sorenson and Waguespack (2006) 
focus on past ties between the distributor and the principal participants of the movie project (the 
director,  producer,  cast,  and  writer)  and  find  that  such  ties  enhance  the  film’s  budget  and 
marketing expenses, but have a negative effect on overall revenues. To date however, no study 
has examined how studio financing decisions affect downstream investment and revenue. 
                                                            
3 In some cases, revenue share may be allocated to the director and/or actors. Such “points” if they are given 
at all, are generally small, less than 5% of box-office receipts.   10 
 
Economics of Independent Films 
In the early 1990s, digital technology lowered the barriers to entry for many independent 
filmmakers, and new sources of financing emerged for independent producers (Levy, 1999). At 
the same time, the commercial potential and artistic quality of independent films came to be 
recognized. In 1992, independent films Howard’s End, The Crying Game, and The Player, were 
not only box-office smashes, but also received more Oscar nominations than any of the movies 
produced  by  the  major  distributors  (Levy,  1999).  By  1994,  the  studios  realized  that  the 
distribution of independently produced films could represent a lucrative source of profits. As a 
result, all six studios launched new divisions to acquire independent films and to finance similar 
projects in-house.  
Notwithstanding the studios’  increased  willingness  to distribute  independent films, the 
harsh reality facing independent producers is that most will fail to secure a distribution contract 
necessary to being their film to theatre screens. Of the 9,000 independent films completed each year, 
only 5 percent are able to obtain access to theatrical distribution (IndieVest, 2006). In contrast, over 
93 percent of studio-financed films receive theatrical distribution.
4 
Film festivals are essentially organized markets for the ‘acquisition’ of independent films 
by  distributors.  However,  competition  for  festival  slots  is  intense.  For  example,  in  2009  the 
prestigious Sundance Film Festival received 3,661 film submissions for 120 slots (Martin, 2009). 
Also only a subset of films screened at festivals go on to secure distribution contracts. In the case 
of Sundance, only around 25 percent of the films screened leave the festival with distribution 
agreements for theatrical release (Barnes, 2010). As a result, independently produced films, even 
those of ‘worthy’ quality, face considerable uncertainty regarding their ability to gain access to 
downstream  distribution.  Geoff  Gilmore,  the  director  of  the  Sundance  Film  Festival,  recently 
                                                            
4 The remaining 7% are released directly on home video (DVD) either because their quality was extremely 
poor, or because of a deliberate attempt to produce a film for the home entertainment market.   11 
declared that “the biggest issue facing independent film is the theatrical distribution bottleneck” 
(Gilmore, 2009). 
Empirical Approach 
Basic Model 
In this section we specify a basic model of property rights, from which we derive our 
hypotheses. The model closely follows Antràs (2003, 2011), and posits a Cobb-Douglas form of 
revenue  function.  This  functional  form  makes  investments  in  production  and  marketing 
complementary (in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1990)), so that films that are more costly to 
produce on average warrant higher levels of marketing investment. This assumption is consistent 
with our data. 
We assume that the expected rental revenue of a film (that is, revenue net of payments to 
theatres) is a function of the film’s production cost, P; marketing cost, M; and a random shock,  , 
which occurs post-production,  but pre-marketing:   
   R0 = aP
xnM
y   ; 
where  a>0, 0< x, y<1, and x+y<1 .  In  addition,  E(n)=1 and sn
2 >0 .  The  subscript  0 
indicates that this is a pre-production revenue estimate.  Here a is a factor that summarizes the 
impact of various ex ante observables (genre, script, etc.) on revenue. P represents production 
cost,  which  is  observable  (perhaps  with  error)  and x represents the elasticity of revenue with 
respect to production cost.5 We interpret n  as an adjustment in revenue expectations that results 
from seeing the actual film (as opposed to reading a script and proposal).6 In the movie industry, 
the quality and commercial potential of a  film  is  extremely difficult to predict before it is 
                                                            
5 We assume that production costs are largely fixed for a given film by the requirements of the script, but 
differ substantially across films. In other words, the script establishes what production costs are necessary, 
and, except within a narrow band, one cannot increase ex ante revenue estimates by simply increasing the 
production budget. In contrast, for a given film, marketing expenses can vary over a wide range, depending 
on how intensively the studio markets the film. 
6 There will be additional shocks once the film is shown to critics and screened in theatres, but we suppress 
those in the interest of notational simplicity. 
  n  12 
produced (De Vany, 2006). As Oscar-winning screenwriter William Goldman famously noted, 
“Nobody knows anything” (Caves, 2000). Thus we expect sn
2 to be large and to have significant 
effects on ex post marketing investments. 
Importantly for our empirical analysis, at the end of the second stage of film-making, 
when the movie has been produced and is about to be distributed, production costs are sunk and 
the realization of n  is known. Hence the post-production revenue estimate, denoted  , is: 
  R1 =(aP
xˆ n)M
y   . 
The terms within parentheses are known when the marketing investment is decided.  They are 
observable to studio decision -makers, but not  necessarily to  outside observers.   To simplify 
notation, we define  Aº aP
xn . Note that A is a random variable pre-production but a known 
quantity post-production.  
As discussed, two types of films enter the distribution channel: studio-financed films 
where the distributor claims a higher percentage of revenue and independent films where the 
distributor  takes  a  lower  percentage  and  remits  the  rest  of  the  revenue  (net of  certain  direct 
expenses) to the producer. From industry practice, the distributor is responsible for marketing 
investments in either case. We make two additional assumptions: (1) marketing investments are 
non-contractible;  and  (2)  y,  the  marginal impact  of  marketing  investments  on  revenue  is  the 
same for both studio-financed and independent films. 
In  terms  of  property  rights  theory,  studio -financing  represents  a  form  of  vertical 
integration, in which the downstream agent controls both stages of a production process (in this 
case  filming  and  distribution)  (Hart,  1995;  Antràs,  2003,  2011).  The  opposite  form,  where  the 
upstream agent controls both stages, is not observed in the industry. Thus, in what follows, we 
will use the terms “studio financing” and “vertical integration” interchangeably. 
Under property rights theory, if a given class of investments is non-contractible, then the 
party that controls those investments will maximize its own profit by setting the marginal benefit 
R1  13 
equal to marginal cost. In our context, marginal benefits differ across film types. Thus, letting the 
subscripts V and I denote vertically integrated and independent films respectively, we have two 
maximization problems: 
Vertically integrated films:   max
MV
AbVMV
y - MV  ; and      (1a) 
Independent films:    max
MI
AbIMI
y - MI
 
   .      (1b) 
Here  bV  and  bI  denote  the  studio’s  revenue  share  in  vertically  integrated  and  independent 
films respectively. Industry practice dictates that bV > bI.  
Solving for optimal marketing investments, we have: 
Vertically integrated films:   MV
* =(bVAy)
1/(1-y)  ; and       (2a) 
Independent films:    MI
* =(bIAy)
1/(1-y)   .        (2b) 
Since bV > bI, the optimal marketing investment in an independent film  less than the optimal 
investment in a comparable vertically integrated film. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: If marketing investments are non-contractible, studios will invest more in marketing their 
own studio-financed films than comparable independent films. 
 
We can also substitute the optimal marketing investments into the ex post revenue functions (for 
simplicity, we suppress the time subscripts on revenue): 
Vertically integrated films:   RV = ˆ A(MV
*)
y; and        (3a) 
Independent films:    RI = ˆ A(MI
*)
y  .        (3b) 
Because of lower marketing investment s, the rental revenue from an independent film will be 
less than  revenue from a comparable independent film. Since rental revenues are  by formula 
approximately 70% of gross box-office receipts, this leads to: 
H2a: If marketing investments are non-contractible, the box-office receipts of studio-financed films 
will be higher than those of comparable independent films. 
 
H2b: The revenue effect will be mediated by higher marketing investments. 
   14 
Our theoretical model and the hypotheses derived from it are driven by differences in 
marginal returns to studios from the marketing of vertically integrated and independent films. 
For the predictions to be valid, some studio decision-makers must perceive this difference and act 
in a manner consistent with property rights theory, i.e., they must withhold marketing resources 
from  independent  films  relative  to  comparable  studio-financed  films.  At  least  one  studio 
executive we interviewed showed full awareness of the different economic incentives associated 
with the two film types. Her studio had recently distributed an independent film (that we will 
call ‘IndieFilm’ for confidentiality purposes) which was not only a success at the box-office, but a 
critical  success  as  well  with  one  of  the  film’s  actors  winning  an  Academy  Award  for  her 
performance.  However,  in  discussing  the  film,  she  remarked  “[IndieFilm]  was  great,  but  we 
didn’t own the movie, we just earned a fee.” She went on to note that when you don’t own a 
movie, but merely distribute it “you’re only earning between 12-20% depending on the volume7 
…  if  it’s  our  movie  we  earn  all  of  it,  but  we  have  to  recoup  our  investment.”  Finally,  she 
highlighted the financial pressures that the studio was under to stabilize earnings in the face of 
persistent pressure and scrutiny from the investor community. This gave us reason to believe that 
our model was a reasonable (albeit incomplete) characterization of studios’ investment behavior. 
Finally, we ask which films are likely to be studio-financed vs. independently produced? 
To address this question analytically, we first define the expected contribution of a film, C , as its  
expected  revenue  minus  marketing  investments: C = R-M .    Expected  contribution  can  be 
assessed  at t=1, when marketing decisions are made, or at  t=0, when financing decisions are 
made.  
Consider a particular film at t=0 with a given production cost,  P, which can be studio-
financed  or independently  produced.  Let dV and dI respectively denote the  ex-ante probability 
that a studio-financed or independent film  will obtain theatrical distribution. As discussed above, 
                                                            
7 The distribution  fee  quoted of  12-20%  is  lower  than  the typical  distribution  fee  of approximately  30% 
reported  elsewhere  in  this  article  and  in  other  sources  (Corts,  2001;  Sorenson  and  Waguespack,  2006). 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the marginal return from distributing independent films is significantly 
lower than that from the distribution of studio-financed films.   15 
independent films have greater difficulty securing distribution than studio financed films, thus 
dV > dI. The difference in ex ante values between the film if studio financed and the same film 
independently produced is: 
  D = dVC0,V -dIC0, I   ; 
where C0, j  denotes  the expected  contribution of each film type   as of  t=0  and  D denotes  the 
difference between these values adjusted for the probabilities of distribution. (Production costs 
are the same in either case, hence drop out of this equation. For simplicity, we ignore discount 
rates, assuming they are also the same in both cases.)  
Substituting for  R and  M
* in the contribution functions and rearranging terms, we have 
for each realization of  ˆ n : 
  D(ˆ n)=(aP
xˆ n)
1/(1-y)×(dVbV
1/(1-y) -dIbI
1/(1-y))×(y
y/(1-y) -y
1/(1-y))   .  (4) 
Since  dV >dI, bV >bI,and x and yall  lie  between  zero  and  one, D(ˆ n)  is  positive  and  strictly 
increasing in production cost. Thus for every realization of the random variable n , the value of the 
film will be higher if it is studio-financed, and more importantly, the difference in value increases 
with the film’s ex ante production cost. And, since the relationship holds for every realization of 
n ,  it  holds a  fortiori  for  D ,  the  expected  value  of D  taken  with  respect  to n .  Thus  D  is 
increasing in production cost. 
Let us assume that for a given film, studio-financing occurs if  D+e >0, where  e  is the 
sum  of  a  set  of  unobservable  factors  which  also  affect  the financing decision.  As  long  as the 
distribution of  e  is constant across films, then, as production costs increase, it is less likely that 
ˆ e <-D  ,  i.e.,  that  other  factors  will  offset  the  value  of  studio  financing. In  this  case,  the 
probability of studio-financing will go up with production cost. This leads to: 
H3: Films with large ex ante production costs, that is, large budgets, are more likely to be studio-
financed than films with small budgets. 
   16 
Theoretical Puzzles 
Hypotheses  1-3  hold  under  the  assumption  that  marketing  investments  are  non-
contractible.  If  marketing  investments  were  contractible,  the  independent  producer  and  the 
distributor could agree on the appropriate level of investment and split the resulting (higher) 
revenue between themselves. 
Interestingly,  marketing  investments  do  seem  to  be  contractible  at  the  local  level. 
Distributors regularly  negotiate screen allocations  with  theatre owners and  secure screens by 
committing to spend a certain minimum amount on advertising and promoting the film.  Theater 
owners are in a good position to monitor distributors’ actions in their own markets. The owners 
and distributors are also in a relational contract with frequent interactions and high reneging 
costs  (Baker  et.  al.  2002).  If  a  theater  owner  felt  the  distributor  had  stinted  on  marketing 
investments for a given film, it would be relatively easy to withhold screens on the next round. 
As a result, the number of screens on which a movie is released in its opening week is intimately 
tied to the marketing budget for the film.  Prior work has found that the number of opening 
screens  for  a  movie  is  highly  correlated  with  actual  advertising  expenditures  (Sorenson  and 
Waguespack, 2006; Elberse and Eliashberg, 2003).  
The contracting problem between distributors and independent production companies is 
more difficult. To monitor the studio’s behavior, a production company would have to gather 
data on advertising and promotion in all markets where the film was released. Also, independent 
production  companies  bring  new  films  to  market  relatively  infrequently,  thus,  the  relational 
contracting threat of withholding the next film may not be a major concern for the studio. (In 
principle, the studio and the production company might negotiate on the number of opening 
screens,  which  is  a  reliable  indicator  of  marketing  investment.  But  by  law  studios  are  not 
supposed  to  control  theatrical  exhibition,  and  thus  a  contractual  promise  to  deliver  a  certain   17 
number of screens for a given film would almost certainly be unenforceable as well as raising 
antitrust concerns.8)  
Alternatively,  the   problem  of  non -contractible  marketing  investments   might  be 
addressed  by changing the nature of  the  transaction between distributors and ind ependent 
producers.  If studios  purchased  independent  films  outright,  instead  of  entering  into  revenue-
sharing agreements, they  would have incentives to  make better marketing investments. Thus 
standard  industry  practice  presents  something  of  a  puzzle  from  the  perspective  of  optimal 
contracting. For now, as in Gil (2009), we will take standard industry practice as given. In the 
conclusion, we will offer a conjecture as to why this seemingly suboptimal form of contracting 
persists. 
 
Empirical Challenges 
As  indicated  in  the  introduction  and  expressed  in  the  model,  property  rights  theory 
posits  two  causal  linkages:  from  marginal  incentives  to  investment  and  from  investment  to 
revenue. Both linkages are important for our tests. To test the distinctive predictions of property 
rights theory, we need to show, first, that film types cause higher (or lower) levels of marketing 
investment in accordance with their marginal returns, and, second, that marketing investments 
cause revenues to move in the predicted direction. 
The need to establish causality naturally creates challenges for our empirical tests. In this 
industry,  the  financing  decision  that  determines  marginal  returns  to  each  film  type  is  an 
endogenous  choice,  which  may  be  affected  by  many  factors,  including  (we  hypothesize) 
production cost. Many of these factors are unobservable and some might directly or indirectly 
affect marketing investment and/or revenue via other channels of causality. To address this issue, 
we adopt a multi-staged analysis using instrumental variables (discussed below).   
                                                            
8 The Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.  -334 U.S. 131 (1948) forced studios to 
vertically disintegrate and ended the practices of “block-booking” and “clearances,” which were designed to 
guarantee screens to films.   18 
It  is  also  possible  for  film  type  to  affect  revenue  in  the  predicted  direction,  but  not 
through  marketing  investment.  To  address  this  issue,  we  implement  separate  two-stage  and 
three-stage simultaneous estimation procedures (Heckman, 1979; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). In 
the three-stage specification, we show that marketing investments fully mediate the impact of 
film type on box-office receipts (Shaver, 2005). This procedure is also discussed in greater detail 
below. 
Data 
The present study is based on a sample of movies distributed by the six major studios 
over a 15 year period, from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2008. The start of this period was 
chosen to coincide with rise of the marketplace for American independent film. 
We began by identifying the movies released theatrically by the six studios using Variety 
magazine’s weekly box-office reports. These reports provide detail on the commercial performance 
of all domestic theatrical releases for a given week, including the number of screens on which the 
movie played and its distributor. For each film released by a major distributor, the first author 
gathered project-level details on its genre, director, cast, budget, producer, etc. from three main 
sources  –  IMDb  (the  Internet  Movie  Database  at  www.imdb.com),  Box  Office  Mojo 
(www.boxofficemojo.com), and The Hollywood Reporter (www.hollywoodreporter.com).  
The original sample was restricted to English language films that were not sequels and that 
were not released on a ‘limited’ basis in their first week of release.
9 Foreign language films were 
excluded  because  they  might  have  different  marginal  returns  with  respect  to  marketing 
investments. Sequels were excluded for the same reason: prior marketing investments on the first 
film might change the marginal returns for the second and later films. Finally, as discussed below, 
                                                            
9 Films that are released in a ‘limited’ manner are exhibited on a few screens (under 20) during their first 
week but are then taken ‘wide’ to a few hundred or thousand screens in the several weeks following its 
initial release.  Typically, this alternative release strategy is used to generate some initial word-of-mouth for 
a film or to qualify it for an Academy Award nomination.   19 
‘limited’ release films were excluded due to the difficulty of measuring marketing investments for 
this sub-sample.  
A  total  of  2016  movies  meeting  these  criteria  were  released  between  1994  and  2008. 
However, the sample itself is limited to 1520 movies for which we have complete financial and 
project-level data. The drop in observations is largely the result of missing film budget information 
for 24% of the population. There is no institution that maintains budget information for all films, 
and  there  is  no  law  that  compels  producers  to  disclose  the  production  costs  of  their  projects 
(Sorenson and Waguespack, 2006; Natividad, 2009). In our dataset, 21.2% of the studio-financed 
films  and  30.8%  of  independent  films  lack  budget  information.  For  both  studio-financed  and 
independent films, univariate tests reveal that the films with missing data received significantly 
lower marketing investments and achieved significantly poorer commercial performance than films 
in each category with valid budget information. Hence, the missing observations are economically 
less  important  that  those  included  in  the  sample.  Furthermore,  the  similarities  in  the  missing 
observations across both sub-samples provided reassurance that the limited sample does not bias 
the tests in any systematic way. 
Measures 
Dependent Variables 
As  indicated,  there  is  a  priori  reason  to  believe  that  marketing  investments  are 
complements of production investments in the revenue function for films. Essentially this means 
that, to reach their revenue potential, big-budget films require higher marketing investments than 
small-budget  films.  (If  the  revenue  function  were  additive,  then  optimal  production  and 
marketing investments would be uncorrelated.) The multiplicative form of the revenue function 
in turn suggests a log-linear specification of the empirical tests. This is borne out by univariate 
analysis of the dependent variables, which shows the variance of outcomes increasing in both 
production and marketing investments. Accordingly, unless otherwise noted, all scalar variables 
are measured in logs (or more specifically, the logarithm after adding one to the scalar in order to   20 
accommodate zero values). This is also consistent with specifications in prior work, for example, 
Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) and Gil (2009).  
The present study examines the effect of vertical integration on two outcomes – Marketing 
Investment and Commercial Performance. We proxy marketing investment (which is not directly 
observable) using the logarithm of the number of screens on which the movie was released in its 
first week. This figure is published and recorded in film databases such as IMDb. As indicated, 
prior work has found that the number of opening screens for a movie is highly correlated with 
actual  advertising  expenditures  (Sorenson  and  Waguespack,  2006;  Elberse  and  Eliashberg, 
2003).
10  
The  Commercial Performance of  a  film  is  measured  as  the  logarithm  of  gross  box-office 
receipts earned through theatrical release in 1994 dollars. This figure is also published and recorded 
in  databases.    Apart  from  directly  measuring  a  critical  source  of  revenue,  a  film’s  box-office 
performance is also considered the primary driver of revenue from ancillary sources, such as DVD 
sales, television broadcast licenses, and film merchandising (Epstein, 2005).  
 
Explanatory and Instrumental Variables 
The main explanatory variable in this study is Vertical Integration, i.e., whether the film 
was studio-financed or independent. We follow Corts (2001) and define vertical integration as a 
binary variable that takes the value one when the parent company of the distributor is also the 
parent  company  of  a  production  company  listed  for  the  film. 11 We  identified  the  parent 
companies of the distributors and production companies by referring to  the acquisitions and 
ownership history of different studios detailed in Natividad (2009) and through additional trade-
                                                            
10 In  the  sample,  7.6%  of  the  films  were  released  in  a  ‘limited’  manner.  For  such  films,  the  number  of 
opening screens is not a good indicator of the marketing investments made by the distributor, and we 
exclude these films from the analysis. Nevertheless, if these films are included in the sample, the results 
remain the same. 
11 Corts (2001) defines an in-house films as “one for which the lead producer’s parent company is also the 
parent company of the distributor.” Corts notes that providing financing for the film secures a share of the 
copyright and that studios are often lead producers when they are listed as a production company. Goettler 
and Leslie (2005) also consider a studio to have an ownership stake in a given film whenever a studio 
division is listed as a production company on the project.    21 
press searches. Specifically, the Variety charts from which we pull our sample lists the studio that 
distributed the film in the United States. We then refer to IMDb for a list of production companies 
credited for the movie’s production.12 Vertical Integration takes the value one when the  studio 
distributing the film and a production company on the project share the same corporate parent, 
and zero otherwise. According to this measure, of the 1,520 films in the sample, 1,092 (71.84%) 
were produced in a vertically integrated manner, while 428 (28.16%) were independent.   
Given  the  hypothesized  complementarity  between  marketing  and  production 
investments, a second key explanatory variable is the Production Cost of the film. Although this 
cost  is  sunk  when  marketing  investments  are  made,  to  the  extent  that  production  cost  is 
correlated with potential revenue, it will affect marketing investments. In addition,  as argued 
above,  expected  production  cost  may  affect  the  choice  between  vertically  integrated  and 
independent production. We measure Production Cost as the logarithm of the film’s budget. The 
budget of a film includes the salaries of the director, producer, cast and crew, as well as forecasts 
of  the  costs  associated  with  film  sets,  special  effects,  and  post-production  editing.  Budget 
information was extracted from multiple sources, including the IMDb, Box Office Mojo, and The 
Hollywood Reporter. As with box-office revenue, budgets are measured in 1994 dollars.  
Producers play a key role in our strategy for obtaining a valid instrument to identify the 
direction of causality in our tests. We construct two measures of producers’ past performance 
and  experience.  We  focus  on  individuals  credited  with  being  a  “producer”  (rather  than  an 
“executive  producer”,  “associate  producer”,  “line  producer”,  or  “co-producer”).  Unlike  these 
other roles, it is the “producer” who actually shepherds the project forward by assembling its 
creative participants and script, raising money, coordinating production, etc. (Schwartz, 2011).  
Producer  Past  Performance  is  measured  as  the  logarithm  of  the  average  box-office 
performance of the producer of the project over his or her prior three films where he or she was a 
                                                            
12 IMDb  collects  and  publishes  the  company  credits  of  each  film  its  database  including  the  production 
companies involved in the project. IMDb permits companies to submit credit corrections to its database. An 
IMDb team evaluates the correction and takes action when necessary. As a result, there is good reason to 
believe that the credits displayed for a movie are accurate.   22 
“producer”.  In  the  case  of  multiple  producers,  we  take  the  average  of  the  individuals’ 
performance over their prior three films. Producer Independent Experience, is an indicator variable 
that denotes whether the movie’s producers financed at least one of their previous three projects 
(where they were credited as a “producer”) in an independent manner and secured theatrical 
release for it. A project’s producers may not have financed any of their prior three films in an 
independent manner either because they are truly new filmmakers with no prior films; because 
they have only worked in alternative roles such as a line producer, associate producer, etc. in the 
past, but never as a full “producer”; or because they have only produced studio-financed films in 
their recent past.  
 
Control Variables 
We  include  a  number  of  control  variables  in  our  tests.  First,  following  prior  work 
(Sorensen and Waguespack, 2006), we control for project characteristics including the Genre of the 
film (comedy, drama, action, etc.), whether the film was rated G or R by the MPAA (MPAA 
Rating), and the Duration of the movie, measured as the logarithm of its runtime. We also control 
for the quality of the main talent and scriptwriters involved in the project (Ravid, 1999). Star Power 
is measured as the logarithm of the average box-office revenue of the film’s director and top five 
cast members, over their prior three films. Writer Performance is measured as the logarithm of the 
average commercial performance of the writers’ previous three projects. Past work has also found 
that independently produced projects are more likely to involve greater Artistic Stake, where the 
director of the film is also its producer and writer (Fee, 2002). We measure Artistic Stake with an 
indicator variable for whether the film’s director was also credited as a producer and writer.  
Finally, we include controls for the Season in which the film is released (measured using 
Vogel’s (2001) seasonality index ranging from 0 to 1), whether the film was produced entirely 
within the United States (U.S. Production), whether the distributor was a minor division within   23 
the larger studio (Minor Label), and the movie’s Critical Rating (measured as an aggregated critical 
review score ranging from 0-100% from www.rottentomatoes.com).
13  
Tables  1  and 2  report the  definitions,  summary statistics,  and pair-wise correlations 
between the variables described above. 
[Place Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
Preliminary Results 
OLS Models 
We  begin  our  analysis  by  presenting  the  results  of  OLS  regressions  where  Marketing 
Investment and Commercial Performance are modeled as a function of Vertical Integration and our 
other control variables, including studio and year fixed effects.  
[Place Table 3 about here] 
  
Table 3 presents the results of our OLS analyses. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.14 In the first column, Vertical Integration has a positive and significant coefficient (at 
the 1% level) in the model of Marketing Investment. Vertically integrated films obtain higher levels 
of marketing investment than independent films, but the reasons for this correlation are not clear. 
Several other independent variables are also significant: we discuss these later when we present 
the results of our multi-staged models. 
In the second column, Commercial Performance is regressed on Vertical Integration and our 
control variables. The positive and significant coefficient of Vertical Integration (significant at the 
1% level) provides evidence that studio-financed films do achieve higher commercial revenues. 
                                                            
13 Later as a robustness check, we include the number of past ties between the distributor and the principal 
creative  participants  as an  additional  control  (Sorenson  and  Waguespack, 2006),  and  the  results  remain 
unchanged.  
14 While clustering standard errors by studio may appear appropriate in order to account for correlation of 
the error terms for movies released by the same studio, clustering is not advisable when there are only a few 
clusters (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). As a result, we compute robust standard errors in all our empirical 
models. Nevertheless, the significance of all our results remains unchanged if we compute standard errors 
clustered by studio.   24 
Turning to the third and final column, Commercial Performance is modeled as in column two, but 
now Marketing Investment  is included as an additional control.  Both  Marketing Investment and 
Vertical Integration have positive and highly significant correlation with Commercial Performance 
(at the 1% level). While the results of this table suggest that a relationship does exist between 
Vertical  Integration,  Marketing  Investments,  and  Commercial  Performance;  it  does  not  provide 
evidence  of  a  causal  relationship,  let  alone  evidence  of  a  mediation  effect.  We  explore  these 
questions in subsequent analyses. 
 
Probit Models of Vertical Integration Choices 
[Place Table 4 about here] 
To determine whether movies with larger production costs are more likely to be financed 
by a studio than an independent source, we look to Table 4. This table presents the results of 
probit regressions where Vertical Integration is modeled as a function of project and producer 
attributes (but excluding Marketing Investment), with distributor and year fixed effects. Model (1) 
is  the  base  model  with  only  control  variables.  Here  Producer Past Performance  is  positive  and 
significant at the 1% level while Minor Label has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 1% 
level as well. 
Model (2) includes the key independent variable, Production Cost. Including this variable 
increases the model’s explanatory power, raising the pseudo R2 from 0.179 to 0.205. Supporting 
hypothesis  H3,  the  coefficient  on  Production  Cost  is  positive  and  significant  at  the  1%  level, 
indicating that movie distributors are more likely to vertically integrate and finance large-budget 
projects. In addition, the inclusion of Production Cost reduces the significance of other explanatory 
variables.  In  particular,  while  Model  (1)  indicated  that  studio-financed  projects  tend  to  have 
significantly greater star power and more successful producers than independent films, these 
factors are only marginally significant after accounting for the higher production costs of studio-
financed films.    25 
In Model (3), we include Producer Independent Experience, an instrumental variable that we 
will  use  to  establish  the  causal  effect  of  vertical  integration  on  marketing  investments  and 
commercial performance. Recall that Producer Independent Experience is an indicator variable that 
denotes  whether  the  movie’s  producers  financed  at  least  one  of  their  previous  three  projects 
independently and secured theatrical release for it. When this is the case, the film’s producers are 
likely  to  have  stronger  relationships  with  investors  outside  the  major  studios  in  order  to 
independently fund new projects, and as a result, may be less inclined to pitch the new project to 
a major studio. Alternatively, producers who have secured studio financing for three prior films 
may  prefer  studio  financing  and  know  how  to  package  a  project  that  is  attractive  to  studio 
decision-makers.  In  either  case,  prior  experience  producing  independently  financed  films 
increases the probability that the next project will be produced in an independent, rather than a 
vertically  integrated  manner.  Consistent  with  this  prediction,  Model  (3)  shows  that  Producer 
Independent Experience has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 1% level.  
Model  4  includes  Critical  Rating  and  Season  as  additional  explanatory  variables.  This 
model contains all the explanatory variables that are included in the first-stage probit of the two- 
and  three-stage  models.  We  observe  that  Critical  Rating  has  a  positive  coefficient  that  is 
marginally  significant  at  the  10%,  while  Season  is  not  significantly  correlated  with  Vertical 
Integration. The significance of the other explanatory variables remains largely unchanged from 
Model (3). 
Testing for Causality—Treatment Effects Models 
As  discussed  above,  to  support  the  distinctive  claims  of  property  rights  theory,  it  is 
necessary to establish a causal link between vertical integration and marketing investments (H1) 
and between marketing investments and commercial performance (H2a and b). Furthermore, the 
tests must account for the fact that vertical integration is endogenously determined and that there 
may  be  unobserved  features  of  the  film  that  simultaneously  influence  vertical  integration, 
marketing investment and box office revenue. In this section, we focus on establishing the causal   26 
effects of vertical integration on marketing investments and commercial performance, leaving the 
analysis of mediation for the next section.  
 
Instrumental Variable and Controls for Unwanted Correlation 
We  estimate  the  treatment  effect  of  vertical  integration  on  marketing  investment  and 
commercial  performance  using  Heckman’s  two-staged  approach  (Heckman,  1979),  where  the 
stages are estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood. The execution of this approach 
requires  at  least  one  instrumental  variable  that  is  correlated  with  vertical  integration  (the 
outcome of the first stage), but not correlated with the error term of the second stage. As noted in 
the previous section, we use Producer Independent Experience as our instrumental variable. The 
results of the probit analysis in Table 4 indicate that this variable is significantly correlated with 
vertical integration. The F-statistic for Producer Independent Experience in the probit model was 
12.04  (from  Model  (4)),  surpassing  the  conventional  threshold  of  10  used  to  designate  an 
instrument as relevant (Stock and Yogo, 2002). 
 Absent controls, the past experience of the producer in making independent films might 
plausibly  influence  both  marketing  investments  and  commercial  performance,  creating 
unwanted correlation with the error term in the second stage. Specifically, some producers might 
consistently  deliver  films  with  positive  quality  shocks  (n )  or  marketing  returns  (y),  thereby 
deservedly  garnering  larger  marketing  investments  and  greater  box-office  success.  The  more 
talented producers (those with high n s or ys relative to peers) might also be more (or less) likely 
have had past experience making independent films. Such uneven clustering could potentially 
create indirect correlation between the instrument and the error term in the second stage and 
thus invalidate our instrument. 
To  address  this  problem,  we  reasoned  that  systematic  cross-sectional  differences  in 
producer quality should be discoverable by looking at the producers’ recent track records. As 
indicated, Producer Past Performance measures the average box office revenue of the producers’   27 
three prior films, thus can serve as a proxy for unobserved producer quality.15  In the presence of 
this control, our instrument is less likely to be correlated with the errors in the second -stage 
models. Although the possibility of correlation through a common causal variable can never be 
completely  ruled  o ut,  our  specification   controls  for  the  most  obvious  source  of  indirect 
correlation between the instrument and the second-stage error. 
A direct correlation between our instrument and marketing investments  or commercial 
performance would arise if studios or audiences systematically favored or discriminated against 
producers based on their past experience . In that case,  the producer’s experience alone, not the 
his or her inherent quality or recent track record, would cause correlation, and our instrumental 
variable would be compromised. In fact Sorenson and Waguespack (2006) present evidence that 
studios overallocate resources to films involving people they have dealt with in the past. Below, 
in the section on robustness and alternative explanations, we address these concerns by switching 
instrumental variables and by including a control for past ties. 
 
Results 
 [Place Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 presents the results of our two-stage treatment effects models. Examining the 
results  of  the  first  stage,  we  see  the  coefficients  in  both  models  are  virtually  identical  and 
consistent the one-stage probit model in Table 4. Producer Independent Experience continues to load 
negatively and significantly at the 1% level.  
Turning to the second-stage results, we see that the treatment effect of Vertical Integration 
on Marketing Investment is positive and significant at the 1% level. Thus we have evidence that 
vertical integration increases the level of marketing investment distributors decide to make on 
                                                            
15 It is possible that some producers might deliver films with consistently higher revenue (high n ) while 
others might generate higher returns on marketing investment (high  y). To allow for the latter type, we 
constructed a variable that measured the average of the ratio of actual revenue to marketing investments for 
three prior films. This variable turned out to be highly collinear (70%) with Producer Past Performance, and 
thus we did not include it in our tests.   28 
behalf of a film, supporting our first hypothesis, H1. Interpreting the economic significance of the 
result, we find that when a studio finances the film project, it increases its marketing investments by 
approximately 120%. Furthermore, Rho is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that 
endogenous selection is indeed a likely source of bias in a  simple OLS regression of vertical 
integration on marketing investment. 
Several  control  variables  also  have  significant  coefficients  in  the  model  of  marketing 
investment. As expected, the coefficient on Production Cost is positive and is highly significant, 
indicating that more expensive films are marketed more heavily by distributors – this correlation 
is consistent with the view that there exist complementarities between marketing and production 
investments  (Brynjolfsson  and  Milgrom,  2010).  Minor  Label  has  a  negative  and  significant 
coefficient (at the 1% level) indicating that the smaller divisions within a studio spend less to 
market their films, after controlling for project-level attributes of the film. Consistent with prior 
work, we find that Critical Rating has a strong negative relationship with marketing investment 
(Elberse and Eliashberg, 2003). Lastly, the positive and significant coefficient of U.S. Production 
indicates  that  movies  filmed  within  the  United  States  receive  larger  marketing  investments, 
possible because audiences are likely to be attracted to familiar settings. 
Interestingly,  although Producer Past Performance has  a  significant  impact  on  the  first-
stage Vertical Integration outcomes, this variable does not have a significant effect on Marketing 
Investment in the second stage. One explanation for the absence of an effect is that on average the 
producer’s track record affects the film’s production budget and marketing investment to the 
same degree. In that case, after including Production Cost in the specification, the Producer Past 
Performance  would  have  no  incremental  effect  on  marketing  investment.  Supporting  this 
conjecture,  in  the  OLS  regression  in  Table  1,  the  coefficient  on  Producer  Past  Performance  is 
insignificant after controlling for Production Cost.  
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 present the second-stage results of the treatment 
effects  model  examining  Commercial  Performance.  Consistent  with  hypothesis  H2a,  Vertical   29 
Integration again has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 1% level. In economic terms, 
vertical integration causes the commercial performance of a film to increase by 81.3%. However, 
Rho is only weakly significant in this test. The endogenous selection of projects appears to be a 
weaker  factor  in  the  analysis  of  commercial  performance  than  in  the  analysis  of  marketing 
investment.  
Looking  again  at  the  control  variables,  we  see  that  Production Cost,  favorable  critical 
reviews (Critical Rating), and releasing the film during a better season (Season) are all associated 
with  higher  revenues.  Longer  movies  (Duration)  and  those  produced  within  the  U.S.  (U.S. 
Production)  also  experience  higher  commercial  performance.  Artistic Stake  has  a  negative  and 
significant coefficient, indicating that movies where the director also serves as a producer and 
writer have lower revenue. Minor Label also has a strong negative relationship with film revenues, 
but its significance is due to the fact that we do not control for marketing investments in this 
model. 
Conditional on the validity of our instrument, the results of Table 5 provide evidence that 
vertical integration does indeed have a positive causal effect on both marketing investments and 
commercial performance. What remains to be seen is to what extent the increased investment in 
marketing mediates the effect of vertical integration on commercial performance. In other words, 
does higher marketing investment drive the higher box office revenues observed for vertically 
integrated films? Or is the higher revenue obtained by some other route? 
Test for Mediation—A Three-Stage Model 
A  three-staged  approach  is  required  to  determine  whether  marketing  investments 
mediate  the  effect  of  vertical  integration  on  commercial  performance  (hypothesis  H2b).  As 
highlighted by Shaver (2005), estimates of mediation effects can be  biased when the different 
steps of the mediation model are estimated independently of one another (as in the OLS results of   30 
Table 3). Instead, mediation effects should be estimated using a system of equations, where the 
equations are estimated simultaneously. For the system of three equations to be identified, we 
need, first, a classic instrumental variable, and second, a variable that is a strong predictor of the 
potential mediating variable (i.e., marketing investment) that does not have a direct effect on the 
dependent variable in the third stage. 
As our second instrument in the three-stage test, we use the indicator, Minor Label, which 
denotes whether the distributor of the film is a smaller division within the larger studio. Minor 
label divisions are likely to have fewer resources with which to market their films compared to 
larger divisions within each studio. Indeed, we saw in the treatment effects model that films 
distributed  by  minor  labels  have  significantly  lower  marketing  expenses  after  controlling  for 
other film characteristics.  At the same time, the fact that a film’s distributor is a minor label is not 
something most consumers know, hence it is not likely to directly influence ultimate box office 
revenue.  
 
Results 
 [Place Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 displays the results of the three-stage analysis. Each column represents a different 
equation of the system. Notably, the coefficients for both the first and second stage estimates are 
very  similar  to  those  in  the  treatment  effects  model  for  Marketing  Investment  (the  first  two 
columns  in  Table  5).  Adding  a  third  stage  and  re-estimating  the  system  of  simultaneous 
equations does not significantly change the results of earlier tests.  
The final column of Table 6 shows results for the third stage of the estimation procedure. 
Here  Commercial  Performance  is  modeled  as  a  function  of  Vertical  Integration  and  Marketing   31 
Investment,  plus  other  control  variables.  The  instruments,  Producer Independent Experience  and 
Minor Label are omitted from this equation. 
In the three-stage model, Marketing Investment has a positive and significant effect (at the 
1% level) on commercial outcomes, but Vertical Integration no longer has a significant effect. Thus 
accounting  for  increased  marketing  investment  essentially  eliminates  the  effect  of  vertical 
integration on commercial performance.  
To  support  the  distinctive  predictions  of  property  rights  theory,  it  would  have  been 
sufficient  for  the  third-stage  coefficient  on  Vertical Integration  to  fall  relative  to  the  two-stage 
treatment effects model (Table 5, Column 4), signaling that the effect of vertical integration was 
partially mediated by marketing investment. But in this case the third-stage coefficient on Vertical 
Integration  is  insignificant,  indicating  that  the  effect  of  vertical  integration  on  commercial 
performance is fully mediated by marketing investments (Shaver, 2005; Baron and Kenny, 1986).  
In summary, our three-stage model jointly tests the key predictions of property rights 
theory and (subject to caveats discussed below) obtains results that are consistent with theoretical 
predictions. In this setting, the expectation of higher marginal returns on vertically integrated 
films leads to higher levels of non-contractible marketing investment, and these higher levels of 
investment  in  turn  give  rise  to  superior  economic  performance.  Furthermore,  these  concerns 
affect the vertical integration decision itself: films with higher production costs, which we have 
argued  suffer  disproportionately  from  reduced  marketing  investment  are  more  likely  to  be 
selected for studio financing. 
Robustness Checks, Alternative Explanations and Limitations 
In  this  section  we  report  the  results  of  various  robustness  checks  on  our  model 
specifications. We describe an alternative explanation of our results, based on past social ties 
(Sorenson and Waguespack, 2006), and show that controlling for past ties does not significantly   32 
change our results. Finally we address a fundamental limitation of this study, the fact that we 
cannot observe marginal returns directly. 
In our primary econometric tests, we did not cluster standard errors. Rerunning the tests 
with clustered standard errors did not change the results significantly.  We also omitted films 
with an initial “limited” release. Our results are robust to including the limited-release films in 
the sample. 
Both the two-stage treatment effects models and the three-stage model depend on the 
instrumental variable Producer Independent Experience. We have argued that, after controlling for 
producer quality (revealed by the producer’s track record), studio vs. independent experience 
alone should not have an incremental effect on Marketing Investment or Commercial Performance. 
However, this assumption can be challenged. Thus to establish the robustness of our multi-stage 
results,  we  ran  additional  tests.  In  the  first  place,  we  reran  our  models  using  Producer  Past 
Performance  as  our  instrument  and  Producer  Independent  Experience  as  a  control.  In  our  tests, 
Producer Past Performance is a proxy for cross-sectional differences in producer quality. All of our 
tests  indicate  that  it  is  highly  correlated  with  Vertical  Integration  even  after  controlling  for 
Production  Cost.  But  after  deciding  whether  to  finance  the  film,  how  much  to  spend,  and 
observing the film’s quality, the producer’s track record may have relatively little incremental 
impact on subsequent investment decisions and/or box office success. As a result, Producer Past 
Performance  is  an  alternative  instrumental  variable  for  our  analysis.  Using  Producer  Past 
Performance as our instrumental variable and repeating our analysis, our results remain consistent. 
That is, we find that vertical integration significantly increases both marketing investments and 
commercial performance, and that the increase in commercial performance is mediated by the 
increase in marketing investments. 
As  another  robustness  test,  we  reran  our  analysis  with  both  Producer  Independent 
Experience and Producer Past Performance serving as instrumental variables. The benefit of using 
more than one instrumental variable is that we can now perform an over-identification to test for   33 
the exogeneity of our instruments. When both Producer Independent Experience and Producer Past 
Performance  are  used  as  instrumental  variables,  our  results  regarding  the  effects  of  vertical 
integration  remain  the  same.  In  the  two-staged  model  for  Marketing  Investments,  the  over-
identification test does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous (p-value 
is  0.35).  Similarly,  the  p-value  of  the  over-identification  test  after  the  two-staged  model  for 
Commercial Performance is 0.25 and again, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are exogenous.  
A  theoretical  challenge  to  our  models  arises  from  prior  work  by  Sorenson  and 
Waguespack (2006). They suggest that distributors may be positively influenced by past social 
ties between the distributor and a film’s “principals”, defined as producers, writers, directors and 
actors.  They  go  on  to  show  that  studios  increase  both  production  budgets  and  marketing 
investments  in  the  presence  of  such  ties.  Sorenson  and  Waguespack  do  not  measure  vertical 
integration hence their tests do not control for differences in the distributors’ marginal returns 
between studio-financed and independent films. If past ties are positively correlated with vertical 
integration, the impact of past ties on production budgets and opening screens might reflect real 
differences in marginal returns, and not a preference for dealing with familiar people. However, 
if  studios  have  a  true  preference  for  past  ties,  and  if  our  instrument,  Producers  Independent 
Experience  happens  to  be  correlated  with  this  measure,  there  could  be  unwanted  correlation 
between our instrument and the error terms of our second- and third-stage models. 
To address this concern, we constructed a measure of past ties along the same lines as in 
Sorenson and Waguespack. Specifically, we calculate the logarithm of one plus the number of 
films the studio distributed of the project’s writers, principal actors, director, and all its producers 
in the prior three years. The raw correlation between past ties and Producer Independent Experience 
was 0.036, indicating there is not cause for concern. We then reran our models, using Producer 
Independent Experience as the instrument, but including the measure of past ties as a control.    34 
Table 7 presents our results. In both the two- and three-stage models our instrumental 
variable  Producer  Independent  Experience  continues  to  be  significantly  correlated  with  vertical 
integration at the 1% level (this can be seen in the first stage probit of the three-staged model). 
Interestingly,  past  ties  between  the  distributor  and  the  film’s  director,  stars,  writers  and 
producers do not appear to have a major impact on Vertical Integration in the presence of the other 
explanatory variables.  
The effects of vertical integration on marketing investment and commercial performance 
are also consistent with our earlier models: vertical integration positively affects both investment 
and performance, with the performance effect fully mediated by investment.  
In both the two- and three-stage models, past ties are positively and significantly (p<1%) 
correlated  with  marketing  investment.    In  other  words,  whether  a  film  is  studio-financed  or 
independent,  it  will  open  with  more  screens  if  the  distributor  has  past  ties  with  the  film’s 
principals. We infer that, ceteris paribus, studios tend to spend more on marketing films with high 
past ties. This is consistent with Sorenson and Waguespack’s results. 
We also find that past ties are positively correlated with commercial performance. This 
stands in contrast to Sorenson and Waguespack’s finding that, after controlling for production 
cost  and  marketing  investment,  past  ties  are  negatively  correlated  with  box  office  revenue. 
However,  is  possible  that  the  negative  coefficient  on  past  ties  in  their  test  is  an  artifact  of 
estimating three separate equations for endogenous variables rather than a simultaneous set of 
equations (Shaver, 2005). Another possibility is that our models allow the production cost of a 
film  to  influence  marketing  investments,  while  Sorenson  and  Waguespack  do  not  consider  a 
relationship to exist between these variables. 
A limitation of our analysis is that we cannot measure the precise marginal returns of 
studio-financed  films.  Goettler  and  Leslie  (2005)  found  that  a  significant  minority  of  studio-
financed  films  were  co-financed  and  thus  subject  to  complicated  revenue  splits  between  the 
distributor and other equity investors. Co-financing reduces the film’s marginal returns to the   35 
studio although co-financed films still generally have higher marginal returns than independent 
films. Thus pooling co-financed and solo-financed films (as we are forced to do) has the effect of 
reducing  the  difference  in  marginal  incentives  between  the  studio-financed  and  independent 
films in our sample. 
Ideally  we  would  like  to  measure  precisely  the  studio’s  revenue  share  in  each  film. 
Instead we must make do with a categorical measure: marginal returns are either “high” (for 
vertically integrated films) or “low” (for independent films). We believe our dependence on a 
coarse measure of marginal returns reinforces, rather than compromises, our tests.  Even with 
this imperfect measure, we obtain results that are (1) supportive of the predictions of property 
rights  theory;  (2)  statistically  significant;  and  (3)  robust  to  alternate  specifications.  However, 
further testing with more precise data is a promising avenue of future research. 
 
Conclusion 
All formal statements of property rights theory are based on two critical predictions: first, 
that higher marginal returns will elicit higher levels of non-contractible investment; and second, 
that higher levels of non-contractible investment will increase project revenue (Grossman and 
Hart,  1986;  Hart  and  Moore,  1990;  Whinston,  2003;  Antràs,  2003).  From  these  predictions  it 
follows  that  property  rights  should  optimally  be  allocated  to  agents  whose  non-contractible 
investments obtain the highest marginal returns. This study contributes to the empirical literature 
on property rights by showing that both predicted linkages (from marginal returns to investment 
and from investment to revenue) exist in a single empirical setting.  
The U. S. film industry is marked by having two distinct property rights regimes: studio-
financed films are produced and distributed by studios which take in the lion’s share of revenue. 
In  contrast,  independent  films  are  distributed  by  studios  under  revenue  sharing  agreements, 
which give studios 30-40% of the revenue stream. Under either regime, the allocation of scarce 
marketing resources is determined by and paid for by the studio.    36 
Studio-financed films thus offer higher marginal returns to marketing investments than 
independent films. A formal model based on property rights theory then yields the following 
predictions: (1) studios will underinvest in the marketing of independent films relative to studio-
financed films; and (2) because of underinvestment, independent films will have lower revenues 
than  comparable  studio-financed  films.  Furthermore,  (3)  if  production  cost  and  marketing 
investment  are  complementary,  underinvestment  in  marketing  will  harm  large-budget  films 
more  than  small-budget  films,  making  it  more  likely  that  large-budget  films  will  be  studio-
financed. Subject to caveats discussed in the previous section, our empirical tests support all three 
predictions.  
We  emphasize  that  these  predictions  differentiate  property  rights  theory  from 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). In determining the optimal ownership of different stages of 
production  and  the  boundaries  of  a  firm,  TCE  focuses  on  the  parties’  vulnerability  to 
opportunism (in the presence of asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of transactions), but 
does not consider the impact of ownership on the parties’ incentives to make non-contractible 
investments in upstream or downstream activities.  
The distinctive predictions of property rights theory depend on envisioning the results of 
non-optimal behavior. Property rights—in theory and in practice—are allocated “in the shadow” 
of  expectations  of  worse  outcomes  under  alternative  allocations.  But  the  reliance  on 
counterfactual reasoning creates challenges for empirical tests of the theory.  Normally in any 
given  industry,  we  expect  to  observe  only  the  “best  possible”  allocation  of  property  rights, 
because suboptimal allocations will be eliminated by optimizing behavior or by competition.  
On rare occasions, however, we might be able to observe “suboptimal” behavior that 
sheds light on the operation of property rights theory and incentives. In the film industry, for 
example, there is (for some reason) a standard revenue-sharing agreement between studios and 
independent  film  owners.  According  to  our  best  estimates,  this  revenue-sharing  arrangement 
leads to suboptimal marketing of independent films.  But if independent films are suboptimally   37 
marketed relative to their studio-financed counterparts, why does the practice of revenue-sharing 
survive? As indicated, other contractual practices, most obviously the outright sale of a post-
production film to a studio could remedy the misaligned marketing incentives of independent 
films. As a conclusion to this paper, we offer a possible explanation for the persistence of revenue 
sharing.  
A seemingly suboptimal practice might be optimal if it is embedded in a larger set of 
negotiations.  Thus  recall  that  the  rights  to  many  studio-financed  films  are  obtained  from 
independent  production  companies  in  transactions  before  filming  begins  (at  t=0).  Revenue 
sharing reduces the value of independent films relative to studio-financed films at this point in 
time.  Thus  the  practice  of  revenue  sharing  reduces  the  disagreement  payoffs  to  independent 
producers when they are negotiating with studios over the sale of film rights. Put bluntly, for a 
production company at t=0, the value of “going independent” is lower if independent films are 
“second-class citizens” when it comes to marketing. 
Under  standard  negotiations  theory,  a  reduction  in  the  disagreement  payoffs  to 
independent producers has two predicted effects: first, it reduces the amount the studio has to 
pay for film rights; and second, it increases the probability that an independent producer will opt 
for studio financing. These effects will be larger for the big-budget productions, which are more 
harmed by underinvestments in marketing. Thus the practice of revenue sharing, although it 
results in opportunity losses for some films, may in fact benefit studios overall by reducing the 
bargaining  power  of  independent  producers  and  making  them  more  compliant  in  ex  ante 
bargaining over film rights. 
A related question is, why have studios “opened their doors” to independent films? This, 
we argue, can be explained by the fact that films are a “risky business.” Much more is known 
about  the  quality  and  revenue  potential  of  a  film  post-production  than  pre-production.  For 
example, suppose a studio has acquired enough films ex ante to fill its distribution channels. It   38 
would not want to pay to produce any more. However, ex post, film outcomes are highly variable: 
some films will have high realizations of  ˆ n , and some low.  
If independent films exist “in the wild”, a studio can inspect them (post-production). The 
studio  can  calculate  the  anticipated  contribution  from  each  of  its  own  films  and  from  the 
independent films under the revenue-sharing agreement. It can then select films with the highest 
contributions until its distribution channel is full. Given enough variability in ex post outcomes (a 
high  enough sn ), the best independent films will h ave higher contributions than the worst 
studio-financed films, and the studio will benefit by swapping one for the other. 
Thus independent film distribution to theatres can be seen as an institutional mechanism 
that allows studios to adapt to post-production information about the value of their own films vs. 
outside opportunities. This in turn justifies  ex ante investment in the production of independent 
films (especially those with small budgets) despite their dampened revenue expectations. 
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Table 1: Definition and Mean Values of Key Variables 
Vertically 
Integrated
Independent
T-test of 
Difference
Vertical Integration
A binary variable indicating whether the 
distributor of a film was also listed as a 
production company for the project
Marketing 
Investment
The logarithm of the number of screens a 
movie was shown on in its first week of release
7.173 5.531 **
Commercial 
Performance
The logarithm of the total box-office gross of 
the movie at the end of its theatrical run 
(adjusted for inflation in 1994 dollars)
16.922 15.518 **
Critical Rating
A score from 0-100 obtained from Rotten 
Tomatoes (www.rottentomatoes.com) 
indicating the percentage of critics who 
recommended the movie to the public
46.731 47.521
Prior Independence 
Experience
An indicator variable that denotes whether the 
movie’s producers (i.e. the individuals that 
received the ‘producer’ credit) financed at least 
one of their previous three projects in an 
independent manner (i.e., without funds from a 
distributor) and secured theatrical release for it
0.487 0.591 **
Producer Past 
Success
The logarithm of the average box-office 
performance of the producers of the project, 
over their prior three films
15.603 13.132 **
Minor Label
An indicator variable for whether the distributor 
was a minor division within the larger studio 
(e.g., Miramax within Disney, or Focus 
Features within Universal)
0.177 0.428 **
Season
The degree to which a film a released during a 
high-attendence period of the year. This is 
measured using Vogel’s (2001) seasonality 
index ranging from 0 to 1
0.638 0.636
Production Cost
The logarithm of the film’s budget (in 1994 
dollars). The budget of a film includes the 
salaries of the director, producer, cast and 
crew, as well as forecasts of the costs 
associated with film sets, special effects, and 
post-production editing.
17.050 16.068 **
Star Power
The logarithm of the average box-office 
revenue of the film’s director and top five cast 
members, over their prior three films.
16.822 15.742 **
U.S. Production
An indicator for whether the film was produced 
entirely within the United States
0.579 0.537
Duration The logarithm of the film's runtime in minutes 4.677 4.645 **
Writer Past 
Performance
The logarithm of the average box-office 
performance of the writers’ previous three 
projects. 
12.728 10.136 **
Artistic Stake
An indicator variable for whether the film’s 
director was also credited as a producer and 
writer
0.130 0.145
** indicates that the difference in means is significant at the 1% level
Variable Defintion
Mean  44 
Table 2: Summary Statistics and Pairwise Correlations (N = 1520) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Vertical Integration 1.000
2
Marketing 
Investment 0.3439** 1.000
3
Commercial 
Performance 0.3664** 0.7245** 1.000
4 Critical Rating -0.0135 -0.3090** 0.1050** 1.000
5
Prior Independence 
Experience -0.0936** -0.0589* -0.0654* -0.0063 1.000
6
Producer Past 
Success 0.2090** 0.3372** 0.2856** -0.1338** 0.2488** 1.000
7 Minor Label -0.2615** -0.6209** -0.4885** 0.2122** 0.0696** -0.2611** 1.000
8 Season 0.0083 0.0308 0.0882** 0.0125 0.031 0.0235 -0.0185 1.000
9 Production Cost 0.3680** 0.6555** 0.6503** -0.1226** 0.0109 0.4218** -0.5509** 0.0136 1.000
10 Star Power 0.2081** 0.2847** 0.2527** -0.0821** 0.0680** 0.2968** -0.2640** 0.0289 0.4387** 1.000
11 U.S. Production 0.0376 0.0233 0.0298 0.0547* -0.0696** -0.0163 -0.0346 0.0332 -0.1043** 0.0267 1.000
12 Duration 0.0873** 0.0627* 0.2361** 0.2627** 0.1054** 0.1784** -0.1052** 0.0024 0.3566** 0.1668** -0.0906** 1.000
13
Writer Past 
Performance 0.1548** 0.2522** 0.2740** -0.0177 0.0055 0.2463** -0.1886** -0.0265 0.4067** 0.2279** -0.0458 0.1804* 1.000
14 Artistic Stake -0.0196 -0.0830** -0.0553* 0.1129** 0.0141 -0.0561* 0.0292 -0.0139 -0.0578* -0.016 0.0363 0.1585* 0.0982** 1.000
Mean 0.718 6.711 16.527 46.953 0.516 14.907 0.247 0.637 16.773 16.518 0.567 4.668 11.998 0.134
Std. Dev. 0.450 2.149 1.725 26.428 0.500 5.320 0.432 0.133 1.201 2.334 0.496 0.167 7.535 0.341
Min 0.000 0.000 9.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10.048 0.000 0.000 4.078 0.000 0.000
Max 1.000 8.322 20.137 100.000 1.000 19.127 1.000 1.000 19.037 18.248 1.000 5.442 19.112 1.000
Significance of correlation: * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  45 
Table 3: OLS estimates for the effect of vertical integration on marketing investments and 
commercial performance 
Marketing Investment 0.488 **
(0.0250)
Vertical Integration 0.452 ** 0.400 ** 0.180 **
(0.0966) (0.0840) (0.0676)
Production Cost 0.737 ** 0.690 ** 0.331 **
(0.0636) (0.0569) (0.0467)
Minor Label -1.531 ** -0.783 ** -0.0360
(0.146) (0.113) (0.0891)
Critical Rating -0.0110 ** 0.0168 ** 0.0222 **
(0.00156) (0.00133) (0.00116)
Season 0.0666 0.635 ** 0.603
(0.281) (0.212) (0.176)
Star Power -0.0294 -0.0334 -0.0191
(0.0215) (0.0230) (0.0183)
Duration -0.119 0.644 ** 0.703 **
(0.285) (0.243) (0.202)
-0.00105 0.00250 0.00301
(0.00523) (0.00465) (0.00370)
0.0108 0.00321 -0.00206
(0.00813) (0.00734) (0.00581)
U.S. Production 0.353 ** 0.276 ** 0.103 +
(0.0751) (0.0634) (0.0526)
Artistic Stake -0.157 -0.227 * -0.151 +
(0.117) (0.0955) (0.0802)
MPAA Rating Controls Yes Yes Yes
Genre Controls Yes Yes Yes
Distributor Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant -4.915 ** 1.024 3.421 **
(1.264) (1.118) (0.943)
Adjusted R
2 0.615 0.563 0.705
N 1520 1520 1520
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
Commercial 
Performance
OLS
Producer Past Performance
Commercial 
Performance
Marketing 
Investment
Writer Past Performance  46 
Table 4: Vertical integration choices of movie distributors (probit) 
 
Critical Rating 0.00286 +
(0.00168)
Season -0.117
(0.279)
Producer Independent Experience -0.289 ** -0.288 **
(0.0828) (0.0830)
Production Cost 0.363 ** 0.359 ** 0.371 **
(0.0611) (0.0608) (0.0616)
Star Power 0.0682 ** 0.0338 0.0353 + 0.0355 +
(0.0208) (0.0206) (0.0204) (0.0203)
Duration 0.582 * -0.267 -0.254 -0.424
(0.284) (0.311) (0.310) (0.326)
Writer Past Performance 0.00858 0.00112 0.000343 0.000134
(0.00527) (0.00554) (0.00558) (0.00558)
Producer Past Performance 0.0276 ** 0.0136 + 0.0224 ** 0.0229 **
(0.00735) (0.00774) (0.00816) (0.00819)
Artistic Stake 0.0520 0.159 0.176 0.173
(0.110) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Minor Label -0.577 ** -0.308 ** -0.271 * -0.296 **
(0.0985) (0.111) (0.111) (0.113)
U.S. Production 0.136 + 0.199 * 0.190 * 0.189 *
(0.0793) (0.0802) (0.0808) (0.0810)
MPAA Rating Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Genre Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distributor Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -3.156 * -4.422 ** -4.412 ** -3.874 **
(1.355) (1.411) (1.399) (1.429)
Pseudo R
2 0.179 0.205 0.212 0.213
N 1520 1520 1520 1520
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
(1)
Vertical Integration
(4) (3) (2)  47 
Table 5: Results of treatment effects models for the effect of vertical integration on marketing 
investments and commercial outcomes 
 
Vertical Integration 0.791 ** 0.595 **
(0.186) (0.138)
Producer Independent Experience -0.286 ** -0.288 **
(0.0825) (0.0827)
Production Cost 0.367 ** 0.701 ** 0.370 ** 0.669 **
(0.0625) (0.0631) (0.0624) (0.0567)
Minor Label -0.309 ** -1.496 ** -0.302 ** -0.762 **
(0.112) (0.144) (0.113) (0.111)
Critical Rating 0.00261 -0.0113 ** 0.00290 0.0167 **
(0.00168) (0.00155) (0.00168) (0.00131)
Season -0.126 0.0799 -0.117 0.643 **
(0.280) (0.279) (0.278) (0.210)
Star Power 0.0362 + -0.0329 0.0369 + -0.0354
(0.0207) (0.0213) (0.0209) (0.0229)
Duration -0.406 -0.0720 -0.432 0.672 **
(0.325) (0.281) (0.326) (0.239)
Writer Past Performance 0.000174 -0.00111 0.0000808 0.00246
(0.00556) (0.00517) (0.00558) (0.00459)
Producer Past Performance 0.0234 ** 0.00916 0.0232 ** 0.00226
(0.00815) (0.00804) (0.00819) (0.00723)
U.S. Production 0.197 * 0.338 ** 0.194 * 0.267 **
(0.0810) (0.0741) (0.0811) (0.0625)
Artistic Stake 0.168 -0.167 0.172 -0.233 *
(0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.0941)
MPAA Rating Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Genre Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distributor Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -3.889 ** -4.728 ** -3.844 ** 1.131
(1.424) (1.248) (1.434) (1.103)
Rho -0.152 ** -0.103 +
(0.0727) (0.0596)
Χ
2 1941.7 1504.7
N 1520 1520 1520
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
Vertical
Integration
(1st Stage)
Marketing 
Investments
(2nd Stage)
Commercial 
Performance
(2nd Stage)
Vertical
Integration
(1st Stage)
Treatment Effects Model for 
Marketing Investments
Treatment Effects Model for 
Commerical Performance  48 
Table 6: Three-staged model to examine of the joint effects of vertical integration and 
downstream marketing investments on commercial outcomes 
 
Marketing Investment 0.512 **
(0.0570)
Vertical Integration 0.793 ** 0.156
(0.210) (0.169)
Minor Label -0.309 ** -1.495 **
(0.112) (0.145)
Producer Independent Experience -0.286 **
(0.0827)
Production Cost 0.367 ** 0.701 ** 0.314 **
(0.0628) (0.0638) (0.0692)
Critical Rating 0.00260 -0.0113 ** 0.0225 **
(0.00173) (0.00155) (0.00138)
Season -0.126 0.0800 0.601 **
(0.280) (0.279) (0.175)
Star Power 0.0362 + -0.0329 -0.0182
(0.0209) (0.0213) (0.0180)
Duration -0.405 -0.0717 0.704 **
(0.328) (0.281) (0.201)
Writer Past Performance 0.000177 -0.00111 0.00303
(0.00557) (0.00517) (0.00365)
Producer Past Performance 0.0234 ** 0.00915 -0.00226
(0.00816) (0.00806) (0.00573)
U.S. Production 0.197 * 0.338 ** 0.0951 +
(0.0810) (0.0742) (0.0556)
Artistic Stake 0.168 -0.167 -0.146 +
(0.117) (0.116) (0.0806)
MPAA Rating Controls Yes Yes Yes
Genre Controls Yes Yes Yes
Distributor Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Constant -3.890 ** -4.727 ** 3.534 **
(1.422) (1.249) (1.055)
Χ
2
N
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
324.1
1520
3-Staged Model Estimated Simulatenously
Marketing 
Investments
(2nd Stage)
Vertical
Integration
(1st Stage)
Commercial 
Performance
(3rd Stage)  49 
Table 7: Results of two-staged and three-staged models with distributor past ties as an 
additional covariate 
 
 
Marketing Investments 0.517 **
(0.0561)
Vertical Integration 0.740 ** 0.553 ** 0.745 ** 0.138
(0.180) (0.135) (0.203) (0.164)
Minor Label -1.513 ** -0.779 ** -0.305 ** -1.512 **
(0.143) (0.110) (0.112) (0.144)
Producer Independent Experience -0.291 **
(0.0829)
Distributor Past Ties 0.109 ** 0.115 ** 0.0652 0.109 ** 0.0590 *
(0.0377) (0.0306) (0.0397) (0.0377) (0.0259)
Production Cost 0.675 ** 0.641 ** 0.347 ** 0.675 ** 0.295 **
(0.0639) (0.0572) (0.0633) (0.0645) (0.0678)
Critical Rating -0.0111 ** 0.0169 ** 0.00277 -0.0111 ** 0.0227 **
(0.00153) (0.00130) (0.00173) (0.00154) (0.00136)
Season 0.0684 0.631 ** -0.124 0.0685 0.595 **
(0.278) (0.210) (0.281) (0.278) (0.175)
Star Power -0.0350 + -0.0377 0.0343 + -0.0350 + -0.0193
(0.0212) (0.0230) (0.0207) (0.0212) (0.0180)
Duration -0.0352 0.712 ** -0.366 -0.0346 0.726 **
(0.277) (0.236) (0.325) (0.278) (0.200)
Writer Past Performance -0.00238 0.00112 -0.000792 -0.00238 0.00235
(0.00520) (0.00456) (0.00557) (0.00520) (0.00364)
Producer Past Performance 0.00673 -0.000342 0.0221 ** 0.00671 -0.00369
(0.00807) (0.00727) (0.00823) (0.00809) (0.00578)
U.S. Production 0.332 ** 0.260 ** 0.189 * 0.332 ** 0.0896
(0.0736) (0.0620) (0.0808) (0.0737) (0.0552)
Artistic Stake -0.163 -0.229 * 0.167 -0.163 -0.144 +
(0.116) (0.0940) (0.117) (0.117) (0.0805)
MPAA Rating Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Genre Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distributor Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes +
Constant -4.539 ** 1.336 -3.813 ** -4.537 ** 3.668** **
(1.243) (1.106) (1.418) (1.243) (1.051)
Rho -0.089 -0.137 +
(0.0575) (0.0699)
Χ
2 1577.6 2006.57
N 1520 1520
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
1520
Marketing 
Investments
Commercial 
Performance
Treatment Effects Model
(2nd Stage)
3-Staged Model Estimated 
Simulatenously
Vertical
Integration
(1st Stage)
Marketing 
Investments
(2nd Stage)
Commercial 
Performance
(3rd Stage)
330.16